“It is a self-deception of philosophers and moralists to imagine that they escape decadence by opposing it. That is beyond their will; and, however little they acknowledge it, one later discovers that they were among the most powerful promoters of decadence.”
Friedrich Nietzsche Quotes
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“You must have chaos within you to give birth to a dancing star.”
“Whatever is done for love always occurs beyond good and evil.”
“It is not a lack of love, but a lack of friendship that makes unhappy marriages.”
“Not when truth is dirty, but when it is shallow, does the enlightened man dislike to wade into its waters.”
“It may be that until now there has been no more potent means for beautifying man himself than piety: it can turn man into so much art, surface, play of colors, graciousness that his sight no longer makes one suffer.---.”
“When the gratitude that many owe to one discards all modesty, then there is fame.”
“One should hold fast one's heart; for when one letteth it go, how quickly doth one's head run away!”
“He who has a why to live can bear almost any how.”
“You look up when you wish to be exalted. And I look down because I am exalted.”
“It is invisible hands that torment and bend us the worst.”
“Nothing is needed more than truth, and in relation to it everything else has only second-rate value.'This unconditional will to truth—what is it? Is it the will not to allow oneself to be deceived? Or is it the will not to deceive? For the will to truth could be interpreted in the second way, too—if only the special case 'I do not want to deceive myself' is subsumed under the generalization 'I do not want to deceive.' But why not deceive?But why not allow oneself to be deceived?Note that the reasons for the former principle belong to an altogether different realm from those for the second. One does not want to allow oneself to be deceived because one assumes that it is harmful, dangerous, calamitous to be deceived. In this sense, science would be a long-range prudence, a caution, a utility; but one could object in all fairness: How is that? Is wanting not to allow oneself to be deceived really less harmful, less dangerous, less calamitous? What do you know in advance of the character of existence to be able to decide whether the greater advantage is on the side of the unconditionally mistrustful or of the unconditionally trusting?”